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INTRODUCTION.
The theme of this paper is an old one. Like most othcV/
philosophical topics, it is noted for the great amount of c".is-
agreement, that clusters around it. Although at all periods
in the history of philosophy, there has been lack of agree-
ment upon the topic to he discussed, still the present age
stands out as one v/hich presents raore different the ories of
consciousness , than. any of the previous ages.
Now my purpose is not to add another theory of conscious-
ness to the present manifold, but rather to select one from
the nanifo]^, and develop it briefly, in order to see more
clearly, its precise view-point. Like many theories, especially
those of late origin, this one has never been really formu-
lated, but has been merely hinted at, and at the most, a few
references made to it. Nevertheless by reaiig such men as
Dewey, and Woodbridge, one can detect that this theory forms
a strong undercurrent, for much of their writing. The theory
under consideration is present in such articles as Dewey's,
Perception and Organic Action
,
and Woodbridge' 0, The J '.atur_e
of consciousness. The theory has been designated by some as
the "relational theory of consciousness." Stated in this
broad manner, however, does not mark it off sharply enough.
For instance, Professor Perry's theory of consciousness al-
though much different from that of Professor Dewey's, might
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well be termed, a relational one. It may be that the
following statement would best describe our point of view:
a pragmatic relational theory of consciousness.
It seems to the writer that the most typical point
concerning the pragmatic relational one, has been in its
procedure, and in the manner in which it has regarded con-
sciousness. The terra 'naturalistic' brings out the thought
I wish to convey. Consciousness is considered an observable
fact and for that reason, has been treated in an observable
way, that is, the naturalistic method has been applied to it,
not only in regard to its explanation, but also in regard to
its definition. This theory is in direct opposition to such
statements as the following, which have uppeared many times
in psychologies and philosophies. The two following quo-
tations illustrate the point;
Golvin1 says ,,it is hardly to be expected that a
completely satisfactory definition of consciousness
will ever be framed. Consciousness is the most fun-
damental and final fact of the Universe. It is there-
fore impossible to give a definition of consciousness
in terms, more elementary than consciousness itself."
Angell^rites "Mental facts, or facts of cons-
ciousness, constitute the field of psychology.
"Consciousness, we can only define in terras of
itself. Sensations, ideas, pains, pleasures, acts
AColvin, Learning Process
.
I., p. 3.
2Angell, Psychology
. I., p. 1-2.

3of memory, imagination, 'and will — these amy serve
to illustrate, the experiences we mean to indicate,
by the term; and our best endeavor to construct a
successful definition, results in such some list of
which we can only say, these taken together are what
I mean by consciousness. A psychological treatise
is really an attempts to furnish the essentials for
such a catalogue.
"It is generally maintained that that despite
our difficulty in framing a satisfactory definition
of consciousness, we can at least detect one or two
of its radical differences, from the physical objects
which make up the rest of our cosmos. These latter
always possess position and extension, i.e., they
occupy space. Psychical facts, or events, never do;
on the other hand, they possess one charactertistic
,
which so far as we know, is wholly wanting to physical
facts, in that they exist for themselves. A man, not
only has sensations and ideas, he knows he has them.
A stone, or other physical object has no such knowledge
of its own existence, or of its own experiences. Yet
whatever they may be the values of these distinctions,
we need entertain no real fear of encountering any se-
rious misapprehension of the inner nature of conscious-
ness, for each one of us experiences it every day, for
himself, and each is thus fitted to discuss it with some
measure of accuracy."

Our problem will be grouped under three heads: first,
does the body change in a typical way, when consciousness
arises; second, does the object change in a typical way
when consciousness arises; third, do the body and object
change correlatively in a typical way when consciousness
arises.
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XX.
DOES THE BODY CHANGE IN A TYPICAL WAY,
WHEN CONSCIOUSNESS ARISES?
The question arises whether there is a typical bodily
change when consciousness occurs. This means whether one
can detect the arrival of consciousness by examining the
body. The facts of ordinary life prove that one can detect
the arrival of consciousness by an examination of the body
alone. We are making the distinction at all times between
conscious and unconscious bodily behavior. All
objects are divided into two clasps: those that never
possess consciousness, and those that do possess it at cer-
tain consciousness. Stated from the standpoint of the body,
this serves that all objects are divided into two clases:
those that never possess conscious behavior, and those
that do possess conscious behavior at certain times.
Although the distinction betv-een conscious and non-
conscious behavior is used by every one, still a state-
ment of the difference between the two kinds of behavior is
another matter.
We must remember, however, that even if conscious
and non-conscious behavior are oftentimes easily stepped
over against each other, still the gap between the two, is
not at all times so wide. The gap between the two becomes
so narrow, that is often impossible to detect the gap at

6all. We must not simplify the facts so much as actually
to change them, but rather attempt a clear account of this
complex affair. The position is simply this: in the first
place, an observer is still necessary to make the distinction
between consciousness and non-consciousness behavior. In a
great many cases, to be sure, it is difficult for any ob-
server to say, whether the behavior is of the one type, or
of the other. In some cases, it is impossible for any ob-
server to decide whether a certain behavior is consciouss
or non-conscious. This is merely another way of saying that
what the character of conscious behavior is, has not yet
been discovered, in full, and for that reason has never
been stated.
Students of animal behavior have, however, discovered
a f ew requisites for conscious behavior. In the first
place certain bodily structures are necessary for an organ-
ism to be conscious. These are, a brain and a nervous sys-
tem. In the second place, the body behaves differently in
at least two respects, when consciousness is present. The
first of these differences cannot be indicated very shortly
but is usually designated vaguely by the term •interestedly.'
Calling conscious behavior one of interest, really means
that conscious behavior can be distinguished from non-con-
scious behavior, without analyzing the different behaviors
and seeing in just what respects they differ. The word
'interest' stands for this unanalyzed difference, and
merely indicates that the difference is recognized, but is

yot undefined. The second difference, however, between con-
scious and non-conscious be havior, may be stated in definite
form. In the case of conscious behavior, the time required
for a reaction to a stimulus, is frequently longer, than is
the case of non-conscious behavior.
One other fact may be mentioned in regard to conscious-
ness in addition to the kind of bodily structures and the
kind of bodily behavior necessary for its appearance. This
other point is the kind of behavior going on in the body, just
before the appearance of consciousness. A certain typical
kind of behavior has been noticed, which preceeds the app-
earance of consciousness, but this behavior is as hard to
describe as is conscious behavior. This state of the body,
which always preceeds the appearance of consciousness, is
usually termed, one of conflict, one in which the wires are
crossed. It is described as one in which the body i3 stim-
ulated to react in more than one way, which ways are incom-
patible with each other. It is sometimes for that reason,
called a period of hesitation.
One other general point might be worthy of mention,
in connection with bodily behavior. Regardless of the fact
that the distinction between conscious and non-conscious
behavior is often made, and made correctly, still there re-
main many cases in which the distinction cannot be made, or
is made incorrectly. What do these cases of error moan?
Do they mean that there is no difference between the two
classes of behavior, or do they mean that not enough know-
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ledge of the situation has been gathered to furnish a basis
for making the distinction in the given case! An instance
of error in connection with behavior, is the same in principle
as error in any other case. The inability to identify con-
scious behavior as such is the same as the inability to id-
entify a given person. &rror in both cases is due to an in-
sufficient knowledge of the situations. The remedy for the
errors is the same, viz., more knowledge concerning the ma-
terials under investigation.
In order to have conscious bodily behavior, first a
brain and nervous system must be present; second, stimuli
evocking conflicting responses must present themselves;
third, the body reacts in an interested way, which way re-
quires more time for reaction than a non-interested form
of response. We have also seen that the cause of error in
regard to the identification of conscious behavior, is on a
par with the cause of errors in any other field, and also
that the remedy for error is the same in all fields.
In order to avoid confusion, it might be well to de-
signate the kind of typical way in v/hich the body does
change upon the appearance of consciousness. There are
two ways in which the organism tuight change. This division
of kinds of change is based upon the procedure which would
be necessary to detect the change for the first time. It
might be that by mere examination of the body alone, one
could say the body is changing in a certain peculiar manner.
On the other hand it might be that this peculiar manner of

change could not be detected unless the environment was
also considered along with the body. That is, the pec-
uliarity of the change may consist in a form of adaptation,
in a peculiar relationship between the body and its environ-
ment. Of course, after this change in the body has been
detected by observing both the body and the environment,
then by use of a criterioft, which may be formed one now can
detect the change in the body by an examination of the body
along. It is this latter kind of typical change, one which
requires the presence of the environment as well as the body,
in order to detect the change in the body, which goes under
the name of 'interest. 1 In the present state of knowledge
the typical change here discussed is a change that must be
stated in terms of a relationship or adaptation of body to
environment. The conclusion we have reached then, in regard
to our first point, is this: when consciousness arises,
the body does change in a typical way, namely, its behavior
becomes interested behavior.
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III,
DOES THE OBJECT CHANGE IN A TYPICAL WAY
WHEN CONSCIOUSNESS ARISES!
We have just reached the conclusion that there is a
typical bodily change upon the arrival of consciousness, and
we now face the question whether there is a typical objective
change upon the appearance of consciousness. At first glance
it is not at all apparent as it was in the case of a body,
that the object changes characteristically when consciousness
arises. The facts of ordinary life lead us to believe in
such a change in the case of the body, but the facts of every-
day life, do not seemingly lead us to believe this kind of
change in the case of the object. Although it is far from
evident upon first consideration that the object does change
typically upon the appearance of consciousness, yet many
theories have been advanced in regard to themanner in which
objects change when they become conscious objects. We will
consider at this point, four different views that hold to a
typical change in the object when consciousne arises.
The first one we will consider, is similar to the view
advanced by John Locke • Locke^^writes "The ideas that make
our complex ones of corporeal substances are of these
three sorts. First, the ideas of the primary qual-
ities of things, which are discovered by our senses,
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II., chap. 23,
paragraph 9.
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and are in them even when we perceive them not: such
are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion
of the parts of bodies, which are really in thera whether
we take notice of them or no. Secondly, the sensible
secondary qualities which depending upon these are no-
thing but the powers those substance huve to produce
several ideas in us, by oursenses, which ideas are not
in the things themselves, otherwise than as anything
is in its cause."
The statement of how objects change in connection with
consciousness, is that they take on all secondary qualities.
An object as we experience it, is divided up into two kinds
of qualities: primary, and secondary. The primary qualities
are shape, size, impenetrability, weight, mobility. The
secondary qualities are all thepther qualities, such as color,
smell, taste, sound, etc. The difference between 'out of
and 'in* consciousness can be stated very briefly and clearly
by advocates of this position. Object 'out of experience
consists of primary qualities. Object 'in* experience con-
sists of primary qualities and secondary qualities. The chang
in the object from this point of view is amere addition oi the
secondary qualities to the object. The best merit of this
theory has already been mentioned, namely, its simplicity and
clearness of statement. Quite naturally one would like to
know what reason there is for making the assertion that se-
condary qualities are added to the object when experienced.
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In other words, is there any evidence for the contention of
the addition of secondary qualities.
The main argument advanced in support of this position
is that of relativity. It is through an application of the
principle of relativity that we arrive at the division of
qualities into primary and secondary. Suppose we examine an
object. Its color, sound, smell, taste, and the rest of the
secondary qualities, depend upon two things: the kind of
body making the observation, and the position of the body
with regard to the object. We find that a change in the
body or in its position results in a change in the secondary
qualities of the object. In other words we find that the
existence of secondary qualities are dependent upon a body
in a certain position. This line of evidence shows that
secondary qualities are dependent upon a certain Stand-
point. It does not show that the secondary qualities are
added to the object. In order to do this it is nsessary to
show that the object minus the secondary qualities arenot
I
dependent upon a standpoint. Merely showing that the se-
condary qualities are dependent upon a standpoint, does not
prove that the addition of the secondary qualities is the
difference that occurs in an object when it is perceived,
unless it is also shown that the primary qualities are in-
dependent of a standpoint. Advocates of this theory have
never shown that primary qualities possess this independence,
and for th at reason have not made out their case. When we
examine the primary qualities, we find that they in turn
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are ju3t as dependent upon a body in a position as were the
secondary qualities.
We have just seen from the consideration of the theory
of secondary qualities, that both primary and secondary
qualities are dependent upon a standpoint. We are now lead
to a second point of view, in regard to change in the object
upon the appearance of consciousness, realizing that relativity
applies to primary qualities as well as to secondary qualities,
lead some to the formulation of a theory which says that all
known qualities of the object appear upon the arrival of con-
sciousness. That is, both primary and secondary qualities are
created when consciousness arises. Karl Pearson 1 writes: "The
reality of a thing depends upon the possibilty of it
occurring in whole, or part as a group of immediate
sense impressions,
"Very much in the position of such a telephone
clerk is the conscious ego of each one of us seated
at the present brain terminals of the sensory nerves.
Not a step nearer than those terminals can the ego
get to the outer world, and what in and for themselves,
are the subscribers to its nerve exchange, it has no
means of ascertaining. Messages in the form of sense
impressions come flowing in from that 'outside world'
and these we analyze, classify, store up, and reason
about. But of the nature of 'things in themselves',
of what may exist at the other end of our system of
*Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, chap. 2.
t
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telephone wires, we know nothing at all. But the things
in themselves, which the sense impressions symbolize,
the reality, as the metaphysicians wished to call it, at
trie other end of the nerve, remains unknown, and is un-
knowable."
This theory states that all known qualities are due to
consciousness. Accordingly what the object is like, out of
consciousness, we do not know. In the case of the former
theory, the addition of the secondary qualities, did not con-
ceal the other qualities, which the object possessed out of
consciousness. In this theory, however, the addition of all
known qualities conceals the real character of the object, as
it is out of consciousness.
The question at once forces itself upon us, v/hat grounds
have we in believing that there is an object out of conscious-
ness, a thing in itself concerning which we know nothing. There
are two ways in which we get at facts: one is through sense
experience; the other by inference. It is admitted that we do
not reach the thing in itself by sense experience. The only
method of approach remaining, is that of inference. An in-
ference is made concerning the miture of facts in order to
explain certain problems which arise out of the facts. The
purpose and justification of an inference is that of explan-
ation. If an inference is made which does not explain, then
we are bound by logical*to withdraw the inference. Whether
fe» one is justified in assuming a thing in itself, then de-
pends^whether a thing in itself explains anything. Up to
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date advocates of A thing in itself, have never indicated
what this unknown 'x' explains. As has often been in-
dicated, our whole experiential life would go along in
just the same manner, whether a thing in itself existed,
or not. In other word3, the assumption is of no practical
value, either as to every day living, or as to purposes
of explanation. One other point might be worthy of mention
in this connection. To say that a thing in itself exists
and in the same breath to say that all knowi*. qualities
of an object, depend upon a standpoint, is a point-blank
contradiction. If all the known qualities of a*\ object
depend upon a standpoint, then the qualities of an object,
called existence, depends upon a standpoint. How then,
can we say a thing in itself exists? We cannot say so,
without contradiction, anymore than we could say, the thing
in itself is red. In the case of asserting that the thing
in itself exists, what we do is to say, first, that existence
is dependent upon the standpoint, and second, that existence
is not dependent upon a standpoint.
hThe method used by both of the two previous^ discussed
theories, which led in one case to the conclusion that con-
sciousness created secondary qualities, and in the other case
to the conclusion, that consciousness created all known
qualities, was that of relativity. The critism of both
theories, was that the principle of relativity was misapplied.
Stated differently, neither theory made use of a thorough-
going relativity. In both cases an absolute was brought into

16
the discussion, in the first theory, the primary qualities
served as the absolute, in the second theory, on unknown
'x' was the absolute. The remedy for the difficulty that
each theory led one into^ by using relativity was more re-
lativity. The leeson to be learned from such procedure, is
that when we consider anything, we must remember that a
standpoint is always involved.
A realization of this has lead to a third theory, which
we will now consider. 1 This position says that consciousness
created the object; in other words that an object exists only
when in consciousness. Of course one cannot prove by direct
experience that an object exists when unpercaived, for the
simple reason that an object cannot both be *out of 'and *in'
consciousness at the same time. However, objects do act in
such a way as to lead one to believe in their continued ex-
istence. To illustrate, this kind of leading, , let us take
a concrete case. Suppose I have a large ball, which I have
placed in the air one hundred feet from the ground. By ac-
tual observation I find that it takes the time T for it to
fall from this position to a position ten feet from the ground
Now suppose that the ball is released, and I do not exper-
ience it in any way, my attention being diverted into other
channels. But after the time T elapses, 1 look around and
find the ball, just where it was on other occasions, when I
had watched the ball in its falling, namely, ten feet from
the ground. Generalizing from such a case, we gat a state-
ment of this character, that objects, if they do possess this
1 See Hume, or John Stuart Hill.
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•presto-chango * nature, act as if they do not . In one case
we get an explainable connected world, in the other case, an
unexplainable, disconnected world. We arrive at such a con-
clusion by the method of inference. We are justified in mak-
ing the inference of a continued existence of object, whether
perceived or unperceived, on the basis that such an assump-
tion explains the world in the most satisfactory manner. This
notion of in' and 'out of consciousness will be treated in
the last chapter in the discussion of relativity, and for that
reason, any criticism, that would apply here, in regard to
'in* and 'out of consciousness will be omitted.
The fourth and last theory we shall discuss, is usually
denoted by the terms 'awareness' or 'togetherness'. McGil-
vary 1 writes: "When anything is experienced it is in a u-
nigue kind of 'togetherness' with certain other things."
^The analysis of experience if thoroughly carried out,
will, I believe, always reveal in addition to the con-
tent of experience, another factor, namely, the unique
togetherness of the content, which makes it into exp-
eriential content.
"This last remark is, of course, an assertion of
' innerjQuplicity' of experience. Whatever upon analysis
shows factors of different kind, is not simple, but com-
plex. Experience is duplex in character, disclosiug upon
analysis, two factors, phases, aspects, call them what
you will; namely, contents and their peculiar mode of
experiential integration. This latter factor is called
*McGilvary, Journal of Philosophy, 1909, pfr JL5 /
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by various names. It is ' experiencing' , * feeling'
,
•consciousness', and awareness. It may be true that
neither the 'plain man' , nor the philosopher defines
these terms in this way, but I think that the fact
which these terms designate, when divested of all that
fancy has clothed this fact with, will be found to be
just the fact of a unique 'togetherness' of things, which
makes these things into experienced things."
This theory is similar to the first theory. The
difference between the two is in the character of the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities. Accord-
ing to this theory all qualities of the object are primary,
except awareness, or togetherness, which is secondary. The
difference between an object "out of" and "in" consciousness
is just this awareness.
Two objections might be raised to this contention. In
the first place in most of our experiences we never have
awareness as constituted a part of the experienced object.
In such an instance, there would be no difference at all,
in the character of the object'out of and 'in' consciousness.
In the second place, when awareness is present, as a charac-
teristic of the object, what ground have we for saying that
awareness depends upon the organism and that the other qual-
ities of the object are independent? As far as dependence
is concerned, all the qualities of an object seem to be on
the same plane. An object possesses awareness when no one
is experiencing it in the same way as it possesses a color,
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a size, or any other attribute. That is, from a certain
standpoint an object possesses the quality awareness, just
as from a certain standpoint it possesses the quality of
color, or size* We cannot separate the awareness from the
object unless we assume that it is possible to deal with
object apart from the limitation of a specific standpoint.
We have just discussed briefly four theories which
attempt to give an account of how an object changes upon
the arrival of consciousness. We have found serious def-
ects in their treatment, which makes their conclusions in-
valid. They have failed to prove than an object changes
when consciousness arises. What conclusion, then, are
we led to by these considerations? As against McGilvary,
we maintain that objects can be considered only with re-
ference to some standpoint. It is therefore illegitimate
to treat objects as existing apart fromall standpoints, in
order to raise the question, what it is that occurs when
a specific standpoint comes into existence. If we are thus
limited to standpoints, it is obviously impossible to ask
what happens to the object when it becomes object for con-
sciousness. To say that we are limited to standpoints, is
to say that objects are conscious objects from the start.
The region beyond experience is Fairyland, and with that
region we have no concern. Our problem therefore narrows
down to this question: Do objects change in a typical way
concomitantly with the typical changes in the body previous-
ly discussed. To this question we now turn in the following
chapter.
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IV.
DO THE BODY AND OBJECT
CHANGE CORRELATIVELY IN A TYPICAL WAY
WHEN CONSCIOUSNESS ARISES!
Since we have arrived at the conclusion that there is
a sense in which the question whether the object changes
when consciousness appears, is an illegitimate question,
the reader might be lead to the belief that our position is
simply that indieated by Professor V,'oodbridge iin his article
Consciousness and Object . He quotes, with approval, the
following: "The object figuring in a conscious, perceptual
situation, differs from the object out of it, in the
possession of consciousness." He also says: "Taking
it for granted that the only difference between an ob-
ject and consciousness of it, is the difference of
consciousness.
.
.
"
To be sure, the only difference between an object
"out of" and "in V consciousness is just consciousness. In
other words, consciousness is not of a nature similar to a
screen, which acts upon and changes its objects. If it is
ones ©wdeavor to emphasize this non-potent characteristic
of consciousness, the statement that the difference bet-
ween an object "out of" and "in" consciousness is just
consciousness, answers very well. But if one does not know
1Wo odb ridge, Consciousness; and Object phil. Rev., XXI.
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what consciousness is, then certainly he would know but
little concerning the difference between "out of" and "in"
consciousness. He would know just this: that if he ever
discovered the nature of consciousness, then his question
would be answered.
T ie trouble with such a statement is that it does not
tell us what consciousness is. Or to put it differently,
it does not make clear whether we are. to accept a thorough-
going relativity, or fall back in the end, upon a conception
of objectivity, like that of llcGilvary * s.
Lt t us examine again the nature of consciousness bodies,
A comparison of conscious with non-conscious bodies, shows
that the environment of a conscious body differs from the
environment of a non-conscious body. The respect in which
the environment differs in the two cases has to do with the
manner in which the two environments act as stimuli. In
the case of both non-conscious and conscious bodies, the
environments are continually changing. The environment of
the conscious bodies, change however, in a different manner,
than the environment of non-conscious bodies. For purposes
of definiteness, let us illustrate this change, in en-
vironment, which is peculiar to conscious bodies. Suppose
I am looking at my paper, and then casually look out of rr.y
window, and then return again to my paper. This example
embodies the peculiar manner in which the environment of
conscious bodies changes. Suppose I desired to give a com-
plete description of my looking out of the window, in the
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above illustration. That portion of the illustration is
not just looking out of the window, but is much more, "'ith
the materials given by the illustration, a description of
looking out of the window, would have to be given, something
after this fashion. While looking at my paper, my paper it-
self changed. The paper became a stimulus to looking out
of the window. The looking out of the window, which followed,
also changed. This change is described as above. The look-
ing out of the window, became a stimulus in turn, to look
back at my paper. This peculiar change in the stimulus,
which occurs at all times, in the environment of conscious
bodies, and only in the environment of conscious bodies,
is sometimes, described more generally in terms of leading.
In other v/ords, the environment of a conscious body,
leads it in this peculiar way, from one stimulus to another
stimulus. The stimulus of a conscious body is always in
this peculiar flux. It is this peculiar flux in a stimulus
that leads the organism from one stimulus to another. As
Dewey 1 says: "The perceived subject matter at every point
in the case of response that has taken effect, with
reference to its character, ILn determining further
response . It exhibits what the organism has done,
but exhibits it with the qualities that attach to
it as part of a process of determining what the or-
ganism is to do . If at any point we let go of the
thread of the organisms' determining its own eventual,
total response, through determining the stimulus to
1 Dewey, Jour, of Phil. & Psy. ft 8ci. Methods
,
IX., 659.
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that response by a series of partial responses, we are
lost."
It is owing to the character of this flux or
leading, that the term adjustment is properly applied
only to the behavior of conscious organisms. The word
"adjustment", it is true, is used quite generally in
at least two ways. In the first instance we speak of
adjustment on the basis of movement. V.!e say a stone
is adjusting itself to the ground, or an organism is
adjusting itself to its environment. Adjustment, as
used here, really means that the object is changing all
the time. When used in this manner the term is so
broad, that is likely to be of little service. It is
at least of no service in our discussion of adjustments.
How then, is the term adjustment used in this dis-
cussion? In the first place, adjustment applies only
to conscious organisms. In the second place, adjust-
ment is not based upon the movement of the body, but
upon the kind of ebject to which the organism is re-
sponding. Since adjustment is determined by the kind
of object present to consciousness, it will be well
to see what kind of an object means adjustment, and
what kind of an object means non-adjustment.
J should say that a sharp distinction can be drawn
between the two classes of objects, namely, those
standing for adjustment, and those standing for non-
adjustment, on the basis of doubt. If an object poss-
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esses a doubtful character, then to that extent, there
is non-adjustment. If an object does not posess a
doubtful character, then the iody is said to be adjusted.
Whether a body is adjusted or not, at any particular
time, then depends upon the question whether the object
in consciousness possesses a doubtful character, i. e.,
whether this leading of the environment meets with con-
flicting leadings or proceeds smoothly and uninterruptedly.
For purposes of clearness, let us take a concrete case.
Suppose I look at my table, and see my papers scattered
over it, and then I pick up a few of them, and begin
to arrange them in a systematic order according to the
page numbers. Under those circumstances one would be
said to be adjusted. Suppose that after a while I come
to a page with no number upon it, and seeing that there
is no number upon it, I wonder where it belongs, or
what number should have been upon it. The addition of
this latter circumstance has made the situation one of
non-adjustment. The paper v/ithout a number Yes a doubt-
ful character, and in that respect, I say my body is
out of adjustment. My body is out of adjustment to that
character of the object, which makes the object a
doubtful one. On the other hand, my body is adjusted
to the characters of the conscious object, such as the
color of the paper, its size, shape, and etc. We may
say, then, that if any character of the conscious ob-
ject is a doubtful one, then the body is not adjusted
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to that character of the object and is ad justed to all
other characters of the conscious object, which are not
doubtful.
We are now in a position to state the nature on con-
sciousness as seen by the writer. The reason why it has been
impossible to state the nature of consciousness before, is
that our method of approach to the problem, would not allow
its statement injfull. At the start, body and object were
abstracted and each treated separately for purposes of sim-
plicity. After this disjunctive procedure, yielded its
results, we took up a conjunctive method of approach, con-
sidering both the object and the body together.
Our discussion has brought out these facts: first,
that conscious bodies differ fnm non-conscious bodies in the
possession of interested behavior; second, that the stimuli
of conscious bodies differ from the stimuli of non-conscious
bodies in the possession of this peculiar kind of change,
which might be termed a new kind of leading. Consciou sness
is then the co rrelation of interested behavior in the body
,
with this new flux character in the stimuli.

V.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
Now that we i ave stated our conception of consciousness
let us take up the main points in these other theories which
led to different conclusions. It seems to the writer that
the difference^ conclusions between the theories presented
for criticism and the one advanced by this paper is due
mainly to two factors, namely, that these other theories abas
the notion of relativity, and that they committed the
fallacy of abstraction.
It has been primarily through the misunderstanding of
the doctrine of relativity that the theories previously
discussed have fallen into error. The misapplication of this
same doctrine has led many other philosophical theories into
insoluble problems, contradictions, and non-intelligibility.
The situation that is presented is an odd one indeed. The
facts of ordinary life lead us directly into relativity, and
this relativity in turn, has always led to dire results. It
is worthy of note that in all instances where error has arisen
the relativity in question was a partial relativity. For
that reason, it has been the endeavor and purpose of this
paper to use a thorough-going relativity. *t seems to the
writer that the difficulties to v/hich the doctrine of re-
lativity l6d, were due entirely to its misapplication. It
was played with fast and loose, at one time strictly applied,
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and at another time, totally ignored. The efforts of the
different theories we have taken up, have shown us at least
hhis; that if an object is treated in an intelligible manner,
it is necessary to consider it from standpoint. Any charac-
teristic that is ascribed to an object such as existence,
color, shape, spatial or temporal relations, causal relations,
has no meaning unless the characteristic ascribed is considered
from a standpoint, thut is, in relation to an experiencing
organism. The application of such a doctrine is what I mean
by a thorough-going relativity.
Although one holds to a belief in such a procedure,
still one is in grave danger of not using the method at all
points. There is one point in particular, that I desire to
emphasize, where the danger of misapplication of the doctrine
of relativity seems greatest. We have noted at great length,
that an object cannot be discussed intelligibly unless we
regarded it from some standpoint. We have not said a word
specifically about the standpoint. A standpoint may be made
an object however, and is subject to the same rules as any
other ooject. This means that a standpoint cannot be dis-
cussed intelligibly, except as regarded from another stand-
point. The whole nature of a standpoint, including its ex-
istence, depends upon another standpoint, in the same manner,
as the whole nature of every object depends upon a standpoint.
For the sake of more specific statement, let us consider
the question: "what is a standpoint?" Our previous remarks
have told us that a standpoint may be classed, first, as an
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object. The distinction is made however, between standpoints
and other objects, upon the basis of structure, and behavior.
The first qualification for a standpoint, is the possession
conscious behavior. This distinction serves the purpose of
making the division between standpoints anc^otheryob j ects . Bu$
what more may be said concerning a standpoint! Two things
may be mentioned in particular: first, a standpoint, con-
sists of a period of time, arbitrarily chosen, and secondly,
it is an adjustment considered as completed.
A period of time is such a concrete thing and so often
used that probably this characteristic of a standpoint needs
no further definition. The otiier consideration, an adjustment
taken as completed, may be worthy of more special attention.
One may very rightly ask when is an adjustment completed,
or is a body ever adjusted. A paradoxical statement of the
situation would be that a body fit any given time is both
completely adjusted and incompletely adjusted. This merely
means that at any given moment a body is completely adjusted
in certah respects, and incompletely adjusted in certain
other respects. Because the standpoint is of this nature,
we term it complete and continuous; complete meaning that
for certain purposes the standpoint is adjusted; continuous
meaning, that for certain other purposes, the standpoint is
out of adjustment, and for th± reason, is continuously
attempting adjustment in these respects.
The one point to be noticed in regard to adjustment,
it its dependence upon purposes and ends. To ask whether a
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standpoint is adjusted or not, without reference to purposes
or ends, is a foolish question indeed, because, it is mean-
ingless. The answer to a question whether a standpoint is
adjusted or not, then depends upon the end under consideration.
If there is end under consideration, then there is no point
in talking about adjustment.
The second fallacy that calls for a brief consideration
is that of abstraction. Many writers make a division similar
to the one made at the beginning of this discussion. They
then treat the matter so divided as if it had always been
divided. In other words, they do not take into account that
they made the division for purely methodological purposes,
Theyusually end up by telling us that consciousness is a
set of bodily wiggles or else that consciousness iw what we
have called object. Some go a? far as to say that the bodily
wiggles and the objects are the same thing seen from two
points of view. Now there is no object to dividing a matter
up into parts, in fact, it is always necessary, butthere are
great objections in dividing a matter up into parts, and then
ignorning the fact that an abstraction has been made.
I emphasize this point because it seens to me that many
of the perplexities of philosophy have arisen from ju3t such
an abstraction. One positive statement then, in regard to
consciousness, is that it can be defined only by considering
uoth the body and the object. The error that has been com-
monly committed by considering the body an object, disjunc-
tively in a definition of consciousness, I will term the
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fallacy of spacial abstraction. Our definition this
considered would be then, as has already been stated, a
body reacting in a certain typical way to an environment.
Let us turn our attention once more to the division of
body and object. We have seen that oftentimes such a di-
vision is guilty of the fallacy of spacial abstraction. By
the recognition of such a fallacy we have been enabled to
make due allowances for it and as a result we have kept our
world intact from a spatial standpoint.
Upon further examination of this method of division,
namely, consciousness in terms of body, and in terras of
object, we find that it not only abstracts spatially, but
also temporally. We must likewise take the fact of temporal
abstraction into consideration in the formulation of our
definition of con^Lousness. If writers have been guilty of
the fallacy of spatial abstraction then they have been doubly,
triply, guilty of the fallacy of temporal abstraction. If
many of the philosophical perplexities have arisen, due to
the fallacy of spatial abstraction, then many of the problems
of philosophy have been created by the fallacy of temporal
abstraction. Recognizing that the device of body and object
as a means of considering consciousness, makes a temporal
abstraction as well as a spatial abstraction, we must take
into consideration this temporal abstraction into our de-
finition of consciousness. This means that consciousness
cannot be defined as a cross-section anymore than it can
be defined as a part of its cross-section. The fallacy of
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spatial and temporal abstraction, works in this way. By
temporal abstraction, things are reduced to cross-section,
these cross-sections are tceated statically, i. e., the
peculiar leading or flux of the environment is omitted. 1
After this reduction spatial abstraction reduces these
cross-sections to parts. As a result of such procedure,
we do not have a world presented to us, by many philos-
ophical systems, but merely a collection of snapshots.
When the temporaljaspect of the situation is taken
into account, we find that what we have is not just body,
but a body in constant change in regard to structure, be-
havior and position. In other words, there is no such
thing as a constant stundpoint. A standpoint is always
changing, which means that the world is different at any
moment for this changing standpoint. Consciousness then
so ems to
_
co nsist _in typical bodily changes, c o rrelated with
typical change s of the environment.
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies
,
chap. 13. Where
consciousness is defined as a* kind of static "organization."
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